I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Traditionally, the Supreme Court Following a subsequent line of decisions by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, it appeared as if that court was requiring a level of suspicion lower than that announced in the United States Supreme Court's original traffic stop cases and in Whitmyer itself.
The Supreme Court of 11 Pennsylvania, in response, decided Commonwealth v. Gleason, holding that 12 the probable cause standard was the only standard to be applied in traffic stop situations, and that the superior court had mistakenly lowered the standard in their previous application of the statutory language. It seemed as if the court 13 in Gleason had finally laid to rest any uncertainties about the suspicion required to make a valid traffic stop. Then, in 2004, the Pennsylvania Legislature, in a move no doubt in response to the court's decision in Gleason, revised section 6308(b) to read as follows:
(b) Authority of Police Officer.-Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. . The superior court denied review of the constitutional issue presented by the appellant in the case because it was not properly preserved at trial. It finally concluded: "Moreover, appellate review of an order denying suppression is limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on appeal." Id. (citations omitted).
18. 889 A.2d 596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 19. Id. at 601-02. Judge Gantman noted, "Our Supreme Court in Whitmyer and later in Gleason referenced Prouse directly in their discussion of probable cause as the appropriate standard for vehicle stops. As such, the propriety of the legislative revision is subject to some debate." Id. at 602 (referring to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ). However, Judge Gantman also noted that the act giving rise to the controversy before her happened prior to the revision of the statute, and so the constitutionality of the amendment was not at issue. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Ulman, 902 A.2d 514, 517 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (mirroring Judge Gantman's reluctance and again not addressing the constitutional issue because it was not directly before the court).
20. are not DUI-related. Doubt has loomed, however. In Commonwealth v. 17 Anderson, Superior Court Judge Gantman, in a combination concurring and 18 dissenting opinion, noted that although the question was not before her, the change in the statutory standard was certainly questionable. 19 Since neither the Superior Court nor the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has addressed the constitutionality of section 6308(b), particularly regarding routine, non-DUI-based traffic stops, this Note does just that. However, the scope of this Note extends only to section 6308(b) and its validity under the Pennsylvania Constitution. No arguments here rest on the Federal Constitution, and any mention of or analogy thereto are only for purposes of persuasive comparison. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, when the issue has been properly preserved before it, has taken the opportunity on a few rare but increasingly common occasions to interpret the provisions of the state constitution independently from its federal counterpart. Conveniently, three of the seminal cases where it has done so all involved article I, section 8. This provision is Pennsylvania's analogue to the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, protecting citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only are the two provisions different in language, but as the state supreme court has noted, they have different meanings, histories, and purposes. 20 In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the 21 first time developed a framework for independent analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution. In this Note, I use that framework to argue the 22 23. At least three cases are on point here: The Edmunds case itself, Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996), and Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1992). These cases will be discussed at length later in this Note. It is noteworthy that in two of these cases, Edmunds and Rodriquez, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court were in direct conflict with article 1, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In both cases, the federal standard was superseded by a more stringent state standard.
24. I am specifically not addressing the reasonable suspicion standard here as applied to DUI situations. Those instances arguably present a different issue.
25. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888. The court also framed the question a second time as "whether the federal Leon test circumvents the acknowledged deficiencies under Pennsylvania law, and prevents the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant." Id. at 891-92. Since the superior court below expressly relied on and incorporated Leon into its opinion, the supreme court had no choice but to address it head-on. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) , concerned the constitutionality of a warrant lacking probable cause on its face. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has interpreted Leon to hold that "the [Fourth] Amendment does not mandate suppression of illegally seized evidence obtained pursuant to a constitutionally defective warrant, so long as the police officer acted in good faith reliance upon the warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate." Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 892.
following: (1) article I, section 8 of the state constitution affords more protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does its federal counterpart; (2) in interpreting article I, section 8, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has consistently required probable cause for routine traffic stops; (3) the requirement is based exclusively on state constitutional law (as opposed to statutory interpretation); (4) article I, section 8 of the state constitution affords even more protection than that which would be required to invalidate the reasonable suspicion standard; and (5) numerous public 23 policy considerations in the commonwealth support the retention of the probable cause standard. In sum, the Pennsylvania Constitution forbids any level of suspicion lower than traditional probable cause for traffic stops, and the state legislature's amendment of the standard was an unconstitutional legislative action. 24 
II. THE EDMUNDS FRAMEWORK
In Edmunds, the court set out its own plan for how independent analysis based on the state constitution should proceed. To understand the case's framework, the substance of the holding, and the commentary on the Pennsylvania Constitution, an overview of some detail is necessary. First, the issue presented to the court was "whether Pennsylvania should adopt the 'good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Leon Pennsylvania Constitution." From the outset, and without much hesitation, 26 one can conclude from the language of the court's opinion that article I, section 8 must "embody" some "guarantees" that the Federal Constitution does not. Furthermore, the court in Edmunds emphasized that state high courts "are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret similar (yet distinct) federal constitutional provisions," and that the federal standard is only a floor below which state courts cannot go.
27
Independent analysis is both permitted and encouraged. 28 In its "plain statement" of the four factors to be weighed in the analysis, the court set out the following for consideration:
(1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; (2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law; (3) related case-law from other states; (4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
29
The court also noted that federal precedent is not totally irrelevant and can be useful in guiding the analysis.
30
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Text
A textual comparison of article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not provide much insight into their possible differences. The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
32
At first blush, the two provisions seem rather similar, even identical, in nature, text, and purpose. However, the state supreme court has time and again reiterated that the textual similarity between the two provisions does not bind the court to making identical interpretations of each. This is an important 33 premise. Other states that have interpreted their own constitutional provisions to afford the same protections as the Fourth Amendment do, at the outset, claim that the identical language between the two is of conclusive significance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has flatly rejected 34 this proposition. An examination of the differences in the history and 35 purpose between the two provisions reveals much difference indeed.
B. History

The Language
The court in Edmunds underwent an extensive analysis of the history of article I, section 8. It noted that the provision is a decade older than its federal counterpart and has its origins in the original state constitution of 1776. That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and possessions free from search and seizure; and therefore warrants, without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and . . . not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not be granted.
Id.
38. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896 (citing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 61 (1980)); see also Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (Pa. 1983). In interpreting the state constitution, the court in Sell concluded that "[i]n construing Article I, section 8, we find it highly significant that the language employed in that provision does not vary in any significant respect from the words of its counterpart in our first constitution. The text of Article I, section 8 thus provides no basis for the conclusion that the philosophy and purpose it embodies today differs from those which first prompted the Commonwealth to guarantee protection from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Id. cause standard developed in Pennsylvania, even more so than in states whose constitutions post-dated the Federal Constitution, has a scope and purpose uniquely independent from the Fourth Amendment.
The Purpose
The state prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is remarkably different than the federal prohibition. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to deter police misconduct. Thus, the federal exclusionary rule, by which 40 illegally seized evidence is kept outside the purview of a jury, operates as a mechanism to enforce fundamental constitutional rights-it is a remedy. no level of suspicion and involved only the Fourth Amendment, it is significant for several reasons. First, the court for the first time balanced the competing interests of the driver and the police during a traffic stop. Balancing these competing interests, the court concluded that the individual's right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions outweighed the ability of the government to stop automobiles at random to ensure public safety. Second, a prime concern of the court was that police officers not be 52
given "unreviewable discretion and authority to intrude into an individual's life for no cause whatsoever." Third, and most important, was the specific 53 rule set out in Swanger. The court held that "before a police officer may stop a single vehicle to determine whether or not the vehicle is being operated in compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code, he must have probable cause based on specific facts which indicate to him either the vehicle or the driver are in violation of the code." Any peace officer, who shall be in uniform, and shall exhibit his badge or other sign of authority, shall have the right to stop any vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of inspecting the said vehicle, as to its equipment and operation . . . and securing of such other information as may be necessary. Id. Even though the language of the statute clearly intends to grant police very broad authority, the court here seems to have read into it the constitutional standard of probable cause.
56. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 253 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1969). 57. Hicks was a case with facts strikingly similar to those in Terry. The defendant was stopped and patted down by police officers on a street in Philadelphia. Id. at 277. The court in Hicks concluded that the seizure was unconstitutional. Id. at 280. The standard adopted was virtually the same as that in Terry-that "police must prove that specific conduct of the seized person, observed by them, justified and made reasonable their belief that criminal activity was afoot and that the seized person was armed and dangerous." Id. at 279.
58 62. Id. at 418. 63. Id. The court's language is telling of its view of the separate and distinct nature of the two situations presented by (1) suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, and (2) suspected criminal activity in which the occupants of a vehicle have participated. Upon review of the Terry standard, the court stated that "[t]hus, it is also clear that an investigative stop of a moving vehicle to be valid must be based upon objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the detained motorist is presently involved in criminal activity." Id. (emphasis added). That criminal activity, as viewed by the court, does not logically include violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. Such violations are to be analyzed separately under the probable cause standard.
64. Id. at 417 ("Under the facts of the instant cause the record is barren of any evidence to suggest a basis for concluding that either the vehicle or its occupants were in any way in violation of the Code.").
this Commonwealth, it is encumbent upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.
61
The standard here is clear. When vehicle is stopped based upon a perceived violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, probable cause is the only sufficient level of suspicion.
Even more important in Murray, however, is the bifurcated analysis that the court performed between the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards. It is here that we find the court first addressing Terry's investigative detention standard and how it applies in the automobile stop context. After analyzing the issue regarding the Motor Vehicle Code violation and concluding that probable cause was not present, the court turned to Terry. The court acknowledged that "[b]ecause a motorist's extreme mobility may otherwise allow him to avoid police confrontation, the State has an equally strong interest in these cases in stopping a moving vehicle to freeze momentarily a situation of suspected criminality." Under the Terry standard, Id. at 1116. I believe the court was being rather considerate here. It is certainly plausible that the legislature intended to statutorily lower the standard applicable to these kinds of stops in their first enactment of this provision. The court here seems to be reading the probable cause standard into the statutory language in order to avoid striking it down on constitutional grounds-something all high courts avoid if at all possible. The amended version of the statute, in its starkly different language, will hopefully not be met with the same benevolence.
criminal activity was suspected. Again, different standards apply to different 65 situations. 66 In the next seminal case, Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, the court for the 67 first time took the opportunity to address the legislature's 1983 enactment of title 75, section 6308(b) of the Pennsylvania Code, allowing for stops by police officers having "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation" of the Vehicle Code. In Whitmyer, the defendant crossed over the 68 white line to pass another car, and was stopped by a police officer who apparently intended to cite him for driving at an unsafe speed. Upon 69 approaching the defendant to issue the citation, the trooper observed the smell of marijuana, found the substance in defendant's coat pocket, and charged him with various possession offenses and driving at an unsafe speed. After the 70 defendant's motion to suppress was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the superior court, the Commonwealth argued that both courts erred both in applying the probable cause standard set forth in Swanger and Murray and in ignoring the language of the statute. The supreme court rejected the notion. 71 It concluded that "when we balance the underlying interests of the individual and the government, the two standards amount to nothing more than a distinction without a difference." Again, it is important to note here that the 72 court's decision did not come as a principle of statutory construction. Its conclusion that the language in the statute could mean nothing less than probable cause came after balancing the interests involved. This is the classic constitutional analysis that the court applied in Swanger and affirmed in Murray. 73 used by the legislature to grant the authority to police officers. The court went on to note that when a police officer stops a vehicle for a violation of the Vehicle Code, no further investigation is necessary after the stop. Either the violation is witnessed, creating probable cause for the stop, or it is not; hence the distinction again between traffic stops and situations where it is necessary to stop a vehicle for suspected criminal activity (where further investigation is the precise purpose of the stop). Terry is therefore inapplicable, both on 75 its law and its facts.
The final significant clarification of the law by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in this area came in Commonwealth v. Gleason. In that case, 76 the defendant was cited for a non-DUI traffic offense. In customary fashion, 77 upon approaching the defendant to issue the citation, the police officer "observed signs of intoxication and performed field sobriety tests," which lead to an ultimate arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. On appeal 78 from the defendant's denied motion to suppress, the superior court weighed the sufficiency of the evidence on a reasonable suspicion standard. The 79 defendant argued that the superior court, in an unpublished decision, impermissibly lowered the standard as set forth in Whitmyer. The supreme 80 court agreed. In assessing its holdings in Swanger, Murray, and Whitmyer, the court concluded, once again, that the presence of the statutory grant of authority did not change the probable cause requirement for traffic stops. In finding the stop of the defendant justified, the superior court had 81 . Id. at 989. The court cited a very large portion of the Whitmyer opinion in its analysis. In doing so, it reiterated the point that the basis of the court's previous decisions regarding the probable cause standard were not based on statutory interpretation. As discussed above, the court rejected this argument in Whitmyer and Gleason. The analysis was based on the competing interests of citizen privacy and public road safety. In each case, inevitably because of the right to privacy under article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the citizens' right to be left alone tipped the scale. [S]ince Gleason, it also appears clear that the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court will no longer tolerate the lesser standard of articulable and reasonable grounds for traffic stops. Rather, if the alleged basis of the traffic stop is to permit a determination of whether there was compliance with the Vehicle Code, it is incumbent upon the police officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe the vehicle or the driver was in violation of a particular section of the Vehicle Code.
88
The problems with the conclusion here are clear. First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court never tolerated a lesser standard for traffic stops-the standard has always been probable cause. The main reason that the reasonable suspicion standard has weighed in the analysis of opinions in the commonwealth is the superior court's current entertainment of this standard in traffic stop cases. Second, a cursory review of the law brings about the conclusion that the "articulable and reasonable grounds" statutory standard meant nothing less than probable cause. In Whitmyer, the supreme court wrote this interpretation into its own jurisprudence. In 2004, in response to the court's holding in Gleason, the Pennsylvania legislature lowered the statutory level of suspicion required for police officers to make traffic stops. Any hope of clarity in the law after Gleason was now 89 extinguished. In a series of difficult cases, the superior court effectively deviated from the supreme court's standard. Although the probable cause rule was not ever based on statutory interpretation, the legislature's decision to lower the standard apparently held preeminent sway with the superior court.
Before I turn my attention to those cases, however, one trial court opinion is worth noting. In probable cause standard, notwithstanding any statutory language to the contrary.
93
The superior court's first significant run-in with the amended statute and its validity came in Commonwealth v. Sands. In Sands, the defendant was 94 stopped by a police officer after the officer had followed him for several miles. Upon stopping the defendant, the officer detected a strong odor of 95 alcohol. After approaching the defendant and speaking with him, the officer noticed that the defendant also used slurred speech and had bloodshot eyes.
96
The defendant was charged and convicted of both driving under the influence and not driving in a single lane. However, it is unclear from the record as 97 reviewed by the superior court which offense lead to the initial stop. The court apparently saw no significance in the distinction. The defendant brought an appeal before the superior court, challenging the constitutionality of the amended version of section 6308(b). In addressing the challenge, the superior court assumed that the justification for the stop was a perceived violation of the DUI provision of the Motor Vehicle Code. In its analysis, the court addressed the standard set out in Swanger, Murray, Whitmyer, and Gleason, and concluded that "all these cases reaffirm the court's holding in Whitmyer that the police must have probable cause to stop a vehicle for a suspected violation of the Vehicle Code."
98
The court argued, however, that unlike the scenario in Whitmyer, in a situation where the initial stop was based on a perceived DUI violation, a further investigation would serve valid purposes. In doing so, the court 99 recognized that courts in Pennsylvania treat vehicular stops differently depending on the nature of the suspected violation of the Vehicle Code. As 101. Id. at 271-72. The court noted: "[O]ur decision here is limited to the constitutionality of Section 6308(b) in so far as it permits an officer to stop a vehicle based upon a reasonable suspicion that the driver is operating the vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Thus, we are not here addressing whether the statute comports with federal and state constitutional protections discussed in cases such as Gleason or Whitmyer where the suspected violation was not DUI." Id. at 270.
102. Even though the reasonableness of DUI stops based on reasonable suspicion may not be as questionable as normal traffic stops, the apparent inconsistency between the standards will remain as long as the criminal DUI statutes remain part of the Motor Vehicle Code. In lumping different levels of suspicion into a single statute, the legislature has, in effect, created its own problem.
103. Sands, 887 A.2d at 268. There are additional problems with the legislative history relied upon by the superior court in coming to their conclusion. I will address them in the policy section of my analysis.
a result, the court held that "the limited intrusion permitted by Section 6308(b) in the case of a vehicular stop based upon a reasonable suspicion that the driver is driving under the influence, as balanced against the Commonwealth's salutary interest in preventing DUI violations, violates neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, Section 8."
Only the constitutionality of the 101 statute regarding DUI stops was addressed. This conclusion, of course, does not get past the fact that the statute applies to all stops under the Motor Vehicle Code, including those of a non-DUI nature. It also does not sufficiently deal with the point that, although the court in Whitmyer stated that further investigation would not have any value in the cases of a non-DUI violation, the standard announced in Whitmyer applies to all traffic stops, however construed.
102
The superior court in Sands addressed, to an extent, the legislative intent behind the statute. It concluded that the intent behind the statute was addressed specifically at DUI cases, and in that capacity, the legislative intent was valid. While the court's conclusion about legislative intent is correct, 103 the problems that it presents are clear. The legislature intended to lower the standard regarding DUI stops. However, as the DUI statute remains part of the Motor Vehicle Code, attempts to lower the constitutional standard set by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will affect all provisions in the Code, however minor. It is true that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has permitted the reasonable suspicion standard to govern Terry-type automobile stops when criminal activity may be afoot (e.g., the court's example of vehicular homicide). Obviously, that crime is not part of the Motor Vehicle Code. And so, the legislature, intending to "lower" the standard regarding DUI stops because of their proximity to other criminal activity, in effect lowered the standard for DUI stops and other minor violations under the Motor Vehicle 107. The facts in this case were not fully recounted. The court stated: "When officer Lash approached the vehicle, he saw that it was driven by Appellant. It is undisputed that at the time of the traffic stop Appellant's blood alcohol content was above the legal limit." Id. The case does not provide the method by which the BAC was tested, the citation of the traffic offenses, or any other procedural facts from the encounter.
108. Id. at 517. The purpose of this conclusion is unclear. The DUI-relatedness of the Sands analysis makes it of little relevance in Ulman. See officer for two alleged violations of the Vehicle Code: driving at an unsafe speed and failing to proceed through an emergency response area with caution. The defendant was ultimately charged with DUI, but it is unclear 106 from the opinion whether the original violations were ever prosecuted. At 107 trial, the defendant's suppression motion was denied. On appeal, the superior court rested its entire opinion on the amended version of the statute. The court did not address the constitutionality of the statute as applied to non-DUI stops, but it did note that regarding DUI stops, the court in Sands found the statute to be constitutionally firm. The court proceeded to disregard all of 108 the appellant's arguments because appellant alluded to cases prior to the 2004 amendment, which, according to the court, no longer applied.
The court 109 then concluded:
The legislative history of this amendment clearly indicates that it was the Legislature's intent to authorize police officers to stop a vehicle based upon a "reasonable suspicion" that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code, rather than the heightened standard of probable cause which was applied in Whitmyer. Since Whitmyer was decided under former Section 6308(b), which required a stricter standard for a traffic stop than the current version of the statute, Whitmyer is not controlling precedent in the present matter.
110
The court's reasoning is not only erroneous, but it is also circular. First, as I have pointed out up to this point, the court's decision in Whitmyer (and Murray and Swanger) was not based on statutory interpretation. Furthermore, the "stricter standard" that the court speaks of was read into the statute in Whitmyer by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself. Basically, the superior court in Ulman concluded that because the prior statute, as interpreted in Whitmyer, required a heightened standard, and the legislature clearly intended to lower the standard, Whitmyer no longer applies because it was decided under the prior version of the statute, which required a stricter standard as interpreted in Whitmyer, etc. . . . The reasoning is tortured indeed. The Ulman court finally concluded that the police officer in Ulman had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, and the conviction for DUI was affirmed.
114. The United States Supreme Court has also noted that "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required for probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990 Id. at 657. The court concluded, particularly regarding DUI violations, that "we might extract the conclusion that there is no basis for 'profiling' a suspected drunk driver merely on the basis of observing undisciplined operation of a vehicle which does not form the basis for a conclusion that there has been a violation of the Vehicle Code." Id.
121. One of the main causes of this haziness, particularly in Pennsylvania cases, is the confused state of the arguments at the trial level. Because the standard has been unstable and unsure for many years, attorneys have, quite erroneously, argued in suppression motions that a particular search or seizure did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support it. The courts make their conclusions of law accordingly, either affirming that the search or seizure had both probable cause and reasonable suspicion, or concluding that it had neither.
It is clear that to meet the reasonable suspicion standard, a police officer need not actually observe the traffic violation in order to stop the driver. 138. Id. The court held that the detection tactics could only be used when "(1) the police are able to articulate reasonable grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek to test; and (2) the police are lawfully present in the place where the canine sniff is conducted." Id.
139. 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996). 140. It should not be forgotten that in Edmunds itself the court declined to follow federal precedent in construing article I, section 8 (regarding the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule). 1992) . The issue in Rodriguez was "whether police officers may detain a person in the vicinity of a drug raid absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion linking that individual to the criminal activity under investigation." Id. at 1379. The court held that detention in such circumstances is unconstitutional. Although the federal precedent argued was held to be inapplicable to the case, the court in Rodriguez held that even assuming that federal case law was on point, the holding was "based only upon principles of Pennsylvania jurisprudence as developed in accordance with our state Constitution." Id. at 1384 n.9.
Court's decision in California v. Hodari D. would apply in Pennsylvania. 141 In Hodari D., the defendant, upon pursuit by police officers, fled a crime scene and was subsequently tackled and arrested.
Before he was 142 apprehended, the defendant discarded a rock of crack cocaine which was later recovered and confiscated by police. The Court held that the evidence was 143 not excludable because no arrest had been performed at the time the drugs were discarded. The pursuit by police did not involve any physical force 144 with lawful authority or any submission to the assertion of such authority.
145
Therefore, no seizure occurred. In Matos, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to adopt the federal definition of "seizure." In doing so, the court 146 emphasized:
This Court has clearly and emphatically recognized that our citizens enjoy a strong right of privacy, and that our citizens are therefore entitled to broader protection in certain circumstances under our state constitution.
. . . . Accordingly, we reject Hodari D. as incompatible with the privacy rights guaranteed to the citizens of this Commonwealth under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
147
The court also emphasized the policy reasons in declining to adopt the holding of Hodari D. Citing Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, the court noted that it 148 had rejected in that case the contention that the goal of curtailing the drug trade permits expansion of police intrusion without the constitutional justification of reasonable suspicion or probable cause:
We emphatically reject the Superior Court's "end justifies the means" analysis. By focusing its attention only upon the serious ills inflicted upon society by illegal 
Case Law Conclusions
These two lines of cases interpreting article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and its applicability to illegal searches and seizures reveal some clear principles. First, probable cause is the standard that has always been applied to routine traffic stops in Pennsylvania. The only reason for the confusion as of late is the misunderstanding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's distinction between traffic stops and traditional Terry situations where the reasonable suspicion standard still appropriately applies. Any inconsistency found in the Vehicle Code between non-DUI and DUI stops results not from the problem with the law, but from the problem of having DUI statutes included in the Motor Vehicle Code itself. DUI stops may in fact be justified on a reasonable suspicion standard. In this situation, the facts of Terry are not as distant as they are in situations involving normal traffic stops, where none of the elements of Terry are present: (1) there is no reason to investigate further upon making the stop; (2) there is little, if any, exigency; (3) there is no initial fear that the drivers of the vehicle are armed and dangerous; and (4) the "criminal activity" that is afoot has already been observed by the patrolling police officer, instantly giving him or her probable cause to make the stop to issue the citation. Not only has the distinction between the two situations been effectively lost on the Pennsylvania Superior Court, but the analysis starting all the way back with Murray and Swanger is inconsistent. Furthermore, any conclusions that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "raised" the standard in cases like Whitmyer and Gleason are simply wrong. Those two cases merely reasserted what the supreme court has been saying for the last thirty years: notwithstanding legislative intent to the contrary, to make a valid traffic stop in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a police officer must have probable cause that either the driver or his vehicle is in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. And, most importantly, the principle is one of constitutional law, not legislative enactment. The second line of cases discussed above reiterates the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, more than most states in the Union, has deviated from United States Supreme Court standards in cases where the express right to privacy found in article I, section 8 is threatened by federal precedent. Moreover, the pre-and post-Edmunds cases in this vein of jurisprudence reveal that when the privacy interest embodied in the state constitution is threatened, only serious societal interests may justify even limited intrusions upon that right. And, since the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 are markedly different, the policies justifying any deviance from strict probable cause requirements will differ depending on which constitutional provision is involved.
IV. OTHER STATES' TREATMENT OF TRAFFIC STOPS
No state, to my knowledge, has yet specifically addressed how its own constitution independently treats the standard to make routine traffic stops. Some inferences can be made from a few of the state cases, but before I turn to them, I want to address the apposite federal standard. In DeJohn, the 150 Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted:
State judges, however, need not ignore the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in opinions rejecting a comparable federal constitutional claim. For a state court interpreting a state constitution, opinions of the United States Supreme Court are like opinions of sister state courts or lower federal courts. While neither binding in a constitutional sense nor precedential in a jurisprudential one, they are entitled to whatever weight their reasoning and intellectual persuasiveness warrant.
151
In assessing the limited federal case law on point in traffic stop situations, I note here that, although it is clear that the Pennsylvania Constitution permits, and possibly requires, that the state exceed a lower federal standard, the federal standard itself may not even be a less protective one. The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the requisite standard to be applied to routine traffic stops. In the cases that come close, it is anything but clear that reasonable suspicion is an acceptable standard.
In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court presented the issue as 153 . Id. at 650. It is not clear whether the two standards enunciated here address separately the two situations contemplated by the court. A possible understanding of the issue presented is that "probable cause to believe" relates to when "the car is being driven contrary to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles" and "reasonable suspicion" governs situations where "either the car or any of its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of other applicable law." Id. If the standards and the situations to which they apply are bifurcated in the sentence structure, this is certainly a plausible reading. If not, it is indeed a careless confusion of the two terms of art.
154. Id. 155. Id. 156. Id. at 663. 157. Id. The court specifically held that "except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 663. Admittedly, this holding does not squarely answer the issue that the court presented at the outset of the opinion.
whether it is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to stop an automobile, being driven on a public highway, for the purpose of checking the driving license of the operator and the registration of the car, where there is neither probable cause to believe nor reasonable suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles or that either the car or any of its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of any other applicable law.
153
While it is unclear at first blush precisely what the two stated standards in this passage refer to, the language contemplates an application of both probable cause and reasonable suspicion. In Prouse, a police officer stopped the defendant in his automobile and, upon conversing with him, smelled marijuana smoke and noticed a bag containing the drug in plain view on defendant's car floor. At the suppression hearing, the police officer testified 154 that he had "observed neither traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity, and that he made the stop only in order to check the driver's license and registration." The Court held that the evidence obtained Where at least reasonable suspicion is not present, the stopping of an automobile driver is unconstitutional.
157
The Supreme Court's reckless use of language in Prouse is disheartening. While the Court's holding seems to set reasonable suspicion as the pertinent floor under which police officers cannot go, in the stated issue at the beginning of the opinion and throughout the Court's discussion, the language is confused. Later on, Justice White concludes: When there is not probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations-or other articulable basis amounting to reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered-we cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be more productive than stopping any other driver.
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This language seems to fit the Court's issue a bit better than its formal holding, especially since the it mentions the probable cause standard and its applicability. However, it remains unclear from the Court's analysis which scenarios require probable cause and which scenarios require reasonable suspicion. Probable cause apparently fits somewhere in the mix, but the Court refrained from telling us just where.
Quite individualized suspicion'" necessary to ensure that police discretion is sufficiently constrained.
165
The Court's interpretation of Prouse here sheds some light on the contemporary understanding of Whren's holding. As quoted above, the Court noted the Prouse Court's suggestion that the best way to protect against abuses of police discretion is to require the police to act upon "observed violations" that provide the "quantum of individualized suspicion" necessary for the seizure to be reasonable. That level of suspicion, albeit permissibly pretextual since Whren, is likely probable cause.
V. POLICY
The fourth prong of the Edmunds analysis requires a consideration of the competing policy arguments underlying the issue involved. There is no better place to start than the statement of legislative intent underlying the amended version of section 6308(b). During deliberations of the bill that became the current version of section 6308(b), one representative noted: permits police officers to stop a vehicle based upon reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 168 The problems with both the legislature's interpretation of the law and with the superior court's assessment are glaring. First, the legislature's argument that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gleason "discarded" the reasonable suspicion standard for DUI stops is plainly false. The standard for traffic stops under the Motor Vehicle Code has always been probable cause, and any application of the reasonable suspicion standard in DUI situations only makes sense because the Terry reasonable suspicion standard is relevant in that scenario. I must reiterate here that the apparent inconsistency between the treatment of DUI and other traffic stops results not from an illogical or "untenable" double standard imposed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, but from the legislature's failure to realize the inherent difference between the two. As long as DUI violations remain part of the Motor Vehicle Code, and stops for potential DUI violations are governed by the same Code, the standard will remain, on its face, the same.
Secondly, the legislature misunderstands why the supreme court requires "probable cause to make a traffic stop based on a Vehicle Code offense while reasonable suspicion is sufficient for other traffic stops." This distinction 169 goes all the way back to Murray and Swanger, and it was reaffirmed in Whitmyer and Gleason. Unfortunately, the superior court and many practitioners have opted to discard it in their day-to-day suppression motion analyses. The distinction mirrors that in Terry. Certain vehicle stops, when it is suspected that real criminal activity is afoot, are justifiable under the reasonable suspicion standard. The court in Sands referenced this kind of a situation when it alluded to "DUI or homicide by vehicle" crimes. The 170 superior court, although via a slightly misunderstood interpretation of the legislature's intent, correctly coupled DUI with vehicle by homicide rather than with, say, driving at an unsafe speed. DUI violations are better analogized to non-Motor Vehicle Code "crimes," particularly with regard to the level of suspicion required to make an automobile stop because of a perceived violation. If the legislature comes to recognize this misalignment, the "untenable" standard imposed by the state supreme court will no doubt come into abrupt focus. Once the police possess probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred they have the unfettered discretion of whether to stop the motorist, to issue a summons or arrest the suspected traffic offender, what ticket or tickets to issue, and will enjoy a virtual guarantee of conviction in court. Because the outcome of the criminal or quasi-criminal process in a traffic case begins and the final outcome of the case is de facto determined during the stop itself, it is clear that the law governing the traffic stop is the only law material to the case. In essence, when the police stop a motorist and issue a summons, any subsequent activity in court is merely a "fiction," a process that has no meaning other then [sic] the process itself, as the actual outcome of the case was decided at the conclusion of the traffic stop. conclusion here is not surprising, particularly given the fact that the Supreme Court has never found an explicit privacy interest directly implicated by the Fourth Amendment. Still, even though a pretexutal purpose for the stop will be upheld, probable cause remains the standard. As I have noted above, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has consistently interpreted article I, section 8 to embody an individual privacy right, and stated that the privacy interests of Pennsylvania citizens do in fact outweigh the need for police officers to be able to make traffic stops at whim. Especially in cases of suspected DUI, reasonable suspicion of a drunk driving violation may indeed be enough to warrant a stop. An arbitrary lowering of the standard to allow the police to seize a driver based on any perceived, or probably perceived, traffic violation does nothing to enhance the safety of the roads of the commonwealth. It does, however, infringe on a right that has been recognized in Pennsylvania since a time predating the Fourth Amendment itself. Furthermore, the problem at the state level now goes beyond the situation in Whren. Pretext in Whren was acceptable because probable cause was first acquired by the police officer. Now, relying on 177 section 6308(b), a police officer in Pennsylvania can have a wholly pretexutal purpose for stopping a driver on less than probable cause. The risk of pretext is far greater than even that afforded by the federal standard-a counterintuitive result given the fact that article I, section 8 unquestioningly affords the citizens of Pennsylvania greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. This is a precarious situation, to say the least.
Several scholars have pointed out the dangers of pretextual stops, particularly since the decision in Whren. A preeminent danger stems from 179 the sheer number of pretextual stops performed daily by law enforcement. Because traffic encounters with police officers occur often, one author has noted that confidence in the law enforcement system is at risk when the stops are arbitrary and without rational explanation. Moreover, another author 180 has argued that the decision in Whren, with its reliance on a purely objective standard regulating police officers' discretion, virtually signaled the death of Terry: "When we allow the police carte blanche authority to use minor traffic violations as a pretext to stop an individual to search for evidence to support reasonable suspicion of a more serious crime, we nullify Terry's first prong."
The author also pointed out a distinction that state courts in 181 particular have failed to make for quite some time-the distinction between a traffic stop and an investigative detention. While they may look identical 182 at the outset (and most courts have stopped here), the searches that they validate are drastically different. Thus, the justification of an "investigative detention" standard for traffic stops does not make sense, especially when the "reasonable suspicion" supporting the stop is subterfuge. Because of the pretext problem, some scholars have encouraged state courts to form their own pretext doctrines, especially if they are permitted to independently construe their own state constitutional provisions. found that a statute requiring a procedure less than a search warrant or subpoena constitutes "authority of law" justifying an intrusion into the "private affairs" of its citizens. This defies the very nature of our constitutional scheme and would set a precedent of legislative deference that I am unwilling to accept in our state's constitutional jurisprudence. It is the court, not the Legislature, that determines the scope of our constitutional protections. 192 Thus, the court, in refusing to recognize the legislature's authority to create exceptions to Washington's warrant requirement, held that the sufficiency of the "authority of law" validating seizures performed pursuant to statutory grants of authority are to be assessed by the court, not the legislature.
The situation in Pennsylvania is similar. The superior court, especially in Sands, determined that the constitutional standards previously announced by the state supreme court were no longer applicable because they were analyzed under the pre-amendment statutory provisions. What the state of Washington recognized in Ladson, and Pennsylvania should recognize here, is that the reasonableness requirement for police seizures of individuals predates any granting of statutory authority by the state legislature. The warrant requirement in Pennsylvania not only predates any version of section 6308(b), but it predates the Fourth Amendment itself. Ladson is therefore relevant to the inquiry here in two ways. First, it shows that other states which similarly interpret their constitutional provisions to afford greater protections than their federal counterparts have not followed Whren specifically because of the dangers that pretext presents.
Second, it reiterates the proposition 193 that the court-not the legislature-determines the standards governing rights embodied in the state constitution.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is perhaps no other area of constitutional jurisprudence that is more confused than that dealing with the semantic (or, arguably, very real) differences between the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards governing seizures of individuals by police officers. Particularly in traffic stop cases, the narrow Terry standard requiring reasonable suspicion has been quickly and haphazardly applied without much consideration of the doctrinal or policy problems associated with these stops. The Pennsylvania Legislature has not escaped the confusion. In amending section 6308(b), it has fallen prey to the misguided notion that the probable cause standard established in Pennsylvania is relatively new and malleable. However, upon closer examination, it is emphatically the case that the probable cause requirement to make traffic stops in Pennsylvania is a matter of constitutional law that cannot be altered by legislative whim. The location of the DUI statute in the Motor Vehicle Code presents clear problems when trying to decipher what standard should govern stops made for suspected violations. A Terry-type standard makes some-even good-sense in these situations as the "criminal activity" going on is of a more serious sort than a minor traffic infraction. However, as it is included in the Motor Vehicle Code, stops are subject to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's probable cause standard.
The legislature's discontent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's "double standard" is thus self-created and cannot be remedied by a simple amendment to section 6308(b) which, like every other statue on the books in the Commonwealth, is subject to constitutional scrutiny. What we inevitably end up with in section 6308(b), then, is a lower standard, perhaps even lower than the federal standard; that is inherently pretextual; that invades the independent right of privacy recognized under article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and that does nothing but confuse both the letter and spirit of constitutional criminal procedure law. And what is more, it does so in furtherance of not a single colorable state policy. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will hopefully get the opportunity to once and for all settle the law in this area and create an example for other states to follow. In doing so, it can reassure the citizens of Pennsylvania that the rights of privacy and protection embodied in article I, section 8 do in fact extend beyond their own driveways.
